Analyzing the Emergence of Semantic Agreement among Rational Agents by Vakili, Golnaz et al.
Analyzing the Emergence of Semantic Agreement
among Rational Agents
Golnaz Vakili1, Thanasis G. Papaioannou2, Zolta´n Miklo´s2, Karl Aberer2, Siavash Khorsandi1
1Dept. of Computer Engineering and Information Technology
Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Email: {g vakili, khorsandi}@aut.ac.ir
2 School of Computer and Communication Sciences
Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Email: firstname.lastname@epfl.ch
Abstract—Todays complex online applications often require
the interaction of multiple services that potentially belong to
different business entities. Interoperability is a core element of
such an environment, yet not a straightforward one. In this paper,
we argue that the emergence of interoperability is an economic
process among rational agents and, although interoperability can
be mutually beneficial for the involved parties, it is also costly
and may fail to emerge. As a sample scenario, we consider the
emergence of semantic interoperability among rational service
agents in the service-oriented architectures (SOA) and analyze
their individual economic incentives with respect to utility, risk
and cost. We model this process as a positive-sum game and study
its equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics. According to our
analysis, which is also experimentally verified, certain conditions
on the communication cost, the cost of technological adaptation,
the expected mutual benefit from interoperability as well as the
expected loss from isolation drive the process.
Index Terms—schema mappings; incentives; game theory; risk;
evolutionary stability
I. INTRODUCTION
Todays emerging complex online applications often require
the orchestration of multiple services that potentially belong
to different business entities. According to the service-oriented
architecture (SOA) design principles, services should be flexi-
ble to discover, select, and use other services to fulfill a given
task and goal [1]. Service interaction (i.e. communication) can
be achieved by syntactic interoperability, while conformance
to the service roles in the service orchestration is pertained
to semantic interoperability [2]. Standardization efforts have
a long history dealing with syntactic interoperability, while
semantic interoperability is still open and mainly dealt with
by ontology alignment, schema mapping and attribute corre-
spondence approaches [3]. However, apart from the technical
challenges for achieving interoperability, the latter is often
a bottom-up dynamic decision making process among self-
interested industrial agents that involves costly information
exchange and technological adaptation for conformance to the
agreed standards [4]. The benefits from adopting standards [5]
as well as the decision making process regarding the optimal
timing for the adoption of a new standard [6] have been well
studied. However, to the best of our knowledge, the dynamic
process of reaching a distributed agreement towards a standard
among rational agents has not been analyzed.
In this paper [funded by the EU project NisB (FP7-ICT
256955)], we employ a game-theoretic approach to analyze
the individual incentives of rational agents in decision-making
towards the emergence of semantic agreement. As a running
example, we consider the real problem of achieving semantic
interoperability among rational service agents in the SOA
context that employ different schemas or ontologies to describe
their interfaces. Service agents that employ a common schema
and wish to utilize services from another agent that employs
a different schema have to collectively reach an agreement
on their local semantic mapping of the former schema to the
later one through costly iterative communication and mapping
re-adjustment. However, if semantic agreement is reached, a
benefit is expected to be mutually enjoyed by the service
agents involved in the semantic mapping creation process,
while a loss is expected for the rest of the agents due to
their semantic isolation. We model this process as a constant
positive-sum game and study its evolutionary dynamics. We
identify as most important parameters for the emergence of
an agreement on semantic mappings: i) the expected bene-
fit from achieving semantic interoperability, ii) the cost of
technological adaptation to the agreed semantic mapping, iii)
the expected semantic isolation cost, and iv) the minimum
required quality of the schema mapping for achieving agree-
ment. The conditions for reaching semantic agreement as
an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) have been identified
and verified by simulation experiments. Our modeling can
be applied in more general distributed settings for achieving
interoperability among rational agents.
II. THE RUNNING EXAMPLE
We focus on a specific problem in semantic interoperability
as a sample scenario that will be used as a running example
throughout the paper. The motivation of this sample scenario is
to address similar semantic interoperability problems encoun-
tered in real applications of web services and other settings.
We consider a system of distributed service repositories where
service providers register their service interfaces. At each reg-
istry, service descriptions are represented based on a specific
structured schema. To keep our analysis generic, we do not
make any assumption on the specific formalism of schemas.
For example, they could be ontologies or XML schemas.
Interoperability between any two sets of service providers
registered in two different registries requires the existence of
semantic mappings between their corresponding schemas. By
semantic interoperability, service agents at the first registry can
employ the services of the agents at the second registry and
vice versa. E.g. a profile management web service at the first
registry is combined with a ticket management service and
a pdf generation service at the second registry to constitute
a value-added social-event ticketing service. Thus, semantic
interoperability increases the business potential for the service
agents at either registry. Any subset of the service providers
that are registered at the same registry may communicate to
each other. The formalism of such schema mappings is beyond
the scope of our work and, without loss of generality, simple
attribute correspondences can be assumed as constituents.
Semantic interoperability in this setting is established by a
consensus among the set of service providers registered at one
registry, on acceptable quality of the schema mapping that is
going to be used in their collaboration with another set in
the system. The more agents that reach a schema mapping of
high quality, the higher the business potential for collectively
constructing complex value-added services with service agents
from the second registry.
Towards the schema mapping creation, initially, each agent
at the first registry has a local version of the schema map-
ping, potentially constructed using commercial tools, such as
AMC [7], COMA++ [8], etc, which have limited effectiveness.
To this end, partial mappings have to be exchanged (through
costly communication) among the agents of the same registry
in order for the quality of the schema mapping to gradually
improve towards a minimum acceptable level (which may be
different for each agent), as the ground truth is unknown. Upon
receiving a partial mapping each agent is able (using one of
the quality metrics in [9]) to evaluate whether replacing its
corresponding local partial mapping leads to an improvement
in the schema mapping quality. However, adopting a new
partial mapping might involve future costs for the agent (e.g.
for the implementation and the system integration of this
mapping), when the schema mapping is materialized. On the
other hand, keeping a heterogeneous schema mapping can
result in market losses due to semantic isolation. In this
economic process, the emergence of semantic interoperability
can be viewed as a decentralized coordination problem for
finding an agreement among rational agents on the quality of
their mapping to another schema.
III. DECENTRALIZED STRATEGY
A decentralized strategy is developed to coordinate rational
decisions of the agents P for collectively constructing a
schema mapping of acceptable quality based on local com-
munications.We refer to the proportion of the agents P who
reach agreement on a certain quality of a schema mapping to
as the consensus level for that schema mapping. The consensus
level is generally unknown, and thus we model it as a random
variable Φ ∈ [0, 1]. As different instances of the schema
mapping have different qualities, we also model the quality of
the schema mapping with a random variable Q ∈ [0, 1]. The
probability distribution of these random variables is discussed
later in this section. To facilitate the decision making analysis,
we employ a discrete random variable Θ that is:
θφ =
{
θ1 ;φ ∈ [0, φ0)
θ2 ;φ ∈ [φ0, 1]
(1)
where φ0 is the consensus level threshold that is sufficient
for the agreement. Therefore, we define that a consensus on
quality of the schema mapping is established when at least
φ0 proportion of the service agents P reach an agreement on
it. The decentralized strategy will guide the decisions of the
agents on advertising their partial mappings on one hand, and
adopting the received advertisements on the other hand.
A. Adoption
The received instance of a mapping µ is taken into con-
sideration by a rational agent if it results in a more qualified
schema mapping in comparison with the currently used one
(by employing one of the quality metrics in [9], e.g. average
string similarity); otherwise, it will be ignored. To guide
rational decisions of the agents, the decentralized strategy is
developed based on a decision model which is constructed in
accordance with the expected individual utility maximization.
Each agent has two choices on receiving an instance of
mapping µ which results in a more qualified schema mapping,
a1 : reject or a2 : adopt it. The uncertain parameter that
affects the decision process is the state of consensus on quality
of the schema mapping. The possible states of the uncertain
parameter is θ1 : no consensus and θ2 : consensus. Then, an
agent will gain a utility U(a|θ) according to its action a and
depending on the state of θ.
Semantic interoperability is mutually beneficial for the
service agents if they agree on an acceptable quality of the
schema mapping; thus, b is defined to represent the marginal
benefit of adopting the received instances of µ if a consensus
is established. Meanwhile, a costly effort ca is exerted by the
agent for the eventual implementation and system integration
of the partial mapping µ. Thus, if an agent adopts the received
instance of µ and a consensus is reached, he gains a utility
b−ca; otherwise, the outcome is only a loss of the value ca, as
he still incurs the adoption cost for attempting interoperability,
yet without getting any benefit from it. On the other hand,
if an agent uses a low quality schema mapping while others
have collectively found one of acceptable quality, then he
should pay a heterogeneity cost; this cost results from his
low expected benefit from interoperability and his expected
market losses from his semantic isolation. We denote ch as the
marginal cost of heterogeneity that is expected to be incurred.
Last, in case that an agent rejects a received instance of µ
while there is eventually no consensus, then no cost or benefit
occurs and thus no utility is obtained. To summarize:
U(a1|θ) =
{
0 ; θ = θ1
−ch ; θ = θ2
, U(a2|θ) =
{
−ca ; θ = θ1
b− ca ; θ = θ2
(2)
This decision making process can be modeled as a positive-
sum game among rational agents with respect to their derived
utilities. Based on Nash equilibrium analysis, there will be
2 equilibria constituted in {(ai
2
, a−i
2
)|θ2} and {(ai1, a−i1 )|θ1}
where ai is the action of an individual pi and a−i is the action
of the other agents pj ∈ P, pj 6= pi. While the first equilibrium
is Pareto-efficient and convinces semantic interoperability, this
question arises that which equilibrium will be chosen by
the system. It depends on the state of θ and actually the
probability distribution of pi(θ) that should be obtained. It
can be concluded from maximum entropy priority [10] that
pi(φ) = U [α, β] where α = 0 and β = 1 to model a prior
distribution for φ as non-informative as possible. Then, it is
straightforward to assess the probability distribution of θ based
on pi(φ) with reference to (1). According to Bayes decision
principle [10], a rational agent’s decision maximizes ρ(a, pi)
that ρ is the Bayesian expected utility and is defined as:
ρ(a, pi) = Epi[U(a|θ)] =
∑
θi∈Θ
U(a|θi)pi(θi) (3)
Therefore, to make an optimal decision the expected utility of
a1 and a2 is assessed respectively by each agent:
Epi[U(a1|θ)] = −ch (1− φ0), E
pi[U(a2|θ)] = b (1− φ0)− ca
Finally, setting Epi[U(a1|θ)] = Epi[U(a2|θ)]will result in:
b+ ch
ca
=
1
1− φ0
; γ ≡
ca
b+ ch
(4)
Thus, when a received instance of mapping µ is taken under
consideration by an agent pi ∈ P , it would be rejected if γi >
(1− φ0) and adopted if γi < (1− φ0). On the other hand, if
the decision analysis results in a1 as the Bayes action in more
than (1−φ0) percent of agents, then it would be impossible to
reach an agreement over the quality of the schema mapping; in
this case with reference to (1), the proportion of the agents that
prefer to keep and use their current instances of the schema
mapping is too high to achieve a consensus on the quality:
Result I. The necessary condition for existence of the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium in the system is that at least φ0 percent
of agents pi ∈ P conclude γi < (1− φ0).
The interpretation of this result is that semantic inter-
operability does emerge in the system only if, in φ0 percent1
of the agents pi ∈ P , the γi (the ratio of adoption cost to the
cost and benefit of interoperability) is less than 1− φ0.
B. Communication
We develop the advertisement decision making model of the
decentralized strategy based on individual risk minimization.
There is always a risk in advertisement of a partial mapping,
as it will be ignored by the receiver agents if it does not
1where threshold of φ0 can be defined to have the same value for all the
participating agents or it can be set by individual agents to different values.
We postpone investigation of the later setting to Section VI.
result in a more qualified schema mapping. Thus, an agent
should make a loss due to taking the risk of advertisement and
incurring a cost of value cadv for the required communication.
However, this should be compared with the opportunity loss
of not advertising a given mapping, that comes by running the
risk of not reaching a consensus because of not advertising a
partial mapping of high quality (as compared to the quality of
the received advertisements). (In the rest of paper, by quality of
a partial mapping we mean, the quality of the schema mapping
that results from making use of this partial mapping.) In other
words, if a consensus is expected to be reached, then the
advertisement cost is expected to be compensated as a justified
investment cost. In the case that a consensus is not expected
to be reached, the adoption cost ca for the current instance
of the local partial mapping is considered to be a loss. Thus,
if the opportunity loss from not advertising a certain partial
mapping is greater than the expected investment loss due to
the advertisement, then the agent should advertise it. Formally,
assuming a decision space ∆ = {δ2, δ1} for advertisement,
where δ2 and δ1 respectively corresponds to advertising or
not a given partial mapping µ, the agent chooses δ2 if the
following condition is true:
cadv· r(δ2) < ca· r(δ1) , (5)
where cadv is the advertisement cost, ca is the adoption cost,
and r(.) is the risk function. For risk formulation, let us
consider the snapshot of the estimated current quality of the
schema mapping of the rest of agent community based on the
received sample of the partial mappings. This quality snapshot
can be seen as a random variable X with probability distribu-
tion f(x) that depends on the consensus level φ. According
to the definition of the quality and the consensus level of the
schema mapping it is reasonable to assume that they are equal
in distribution: ∀x ∈ [0, 1], P (Q ≤ x) = P (Φ ≤ x). It can be
argued in justification of this assumption that, the higher the
quality of the schema mapping, the higher consensus level of
it is expected (as mentioned, only a higher quality instance of
a received partial mapping maybe adopted by a rational agent).
As the quality of the schema mapping of the agent community
and the consensus level are equal in distribution, while x can
be considered to be independent from φ, thus, f(x|φ) = pi(φ).
The Bayes risk of an advertisement decision is defined by [10]:
r(δ) = EpiEx[L(φ, δ)] , (6)
where L(φ, δ) is the loss function of advertisement according
to the consensus level and can be developed from utility theory
[10]. Let x0 denote the quality of local schema mapping that
results from using the instance of µ, which is subject to be
advertised. We consider L(.) to be in [0, 1] where, the choice
of this interval serves only to set the scale for L. Given the
assumption that the loss depends on the probability that an
advertised mapping is adopted by other agents, the highest
and the lowest losses are associated to δ2 (advertising) and δ1
respectively when the relative quality of x0 to x is low. More
specifically, if kx0 ≤ x, then L(δ2) = 1 and L(δ1) = 0; k is a
tolerance factor that can be defined as a statistic metric on the
resulting quality of the local schema mapping based on the
received advertisements. On the other hand, when kx0 > x,
the higher the quality of the instance, the lower the probability
that other agents ignore the advertisement and the less the loss.
In this case, we assume L(δ1) = x0 and L(δ2) = 1−x0. Then:
L(φ, δ1(x)) =
{
x0 ;x < kx0
0 ;x ≥ kx0
, L(φ, δ2(x)) =
{
1− x0 ;x < kx0
1 ;x ≥ kx0
Substituting loss formulas to the equation (6) and applying
r(δ1) and r(δ2) in equation (5), we obtain after some algebra
the optimal advertisement rule δ∗ determined by individual
agents: δ∗ = δ1 if x0 < x∗ and δ∗ = δ2 if x0 > x∗; where
x∗ = {cadv/((cadv + ca)· k)}
1/2
.
IV. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZED STRATEGY
To take advantage of the information that becomes available
through advertisements, the distribution of φ at the time of
decision making should be the posterior distribution, pi(φ|x).
Then, it reflects the updated belief of a participant on the
global consensus level of the schema mapping after observing
the sample x through the advertisement of partial mappings.
To this end, the uniform distribution of φ over 0 and 1 is
revised to model pi(φ|x). According to the interest of the
agents in reaching a consensus, the upper bound of pi(φ|x)
is always set to 1. The lower bound is set to α, where based
on the equality of Φ and Q in distribution, α can be considered
by individual agents, as the minimum quality of the schema
mapping results from using the received advertisements. Thus:
pi∗(θ) = (φ0−α)/(1−α) if θ = θ1 and (1−φ0)/(1−α) if θ = θ2.
where pi(θ|x) is denoted by pi∗(θ). Based on the value of α,
two situations can be distinguished:
Case (i) if 0 < α < φ0, then the expected utilities are assessed
in accordance with Bayesian expected utility formula:
Epi
∗
[U(a1|θ)] = −ch (1− φ0)/(1− α)
Epi
∗
[U(a2|θ)] = b (1− φ0)/(1− α)− ca
(7)
To determine the Bayes action api∗ , we should find the
crosspoint of these monotonic functions. After some algebra:
(1− α)γ = (1− φ0) (8)
Thus, in this situation, when a received instance of a partial
mapping is taken under consideration by a rational agent pi ∈
P , it would be rejected if γi (1−αi) > (1−φ0)and adopted if
γi (1− αi) < (1− φ0). On the other hand, as we discussed in
Section 3, if the decision analysis results in api∗ = a1 in more
than (1−φ0)percent of service agents, it would be impossible
to reach an agreement over the quality of the schema mapping:
Result II. The necessary condition for existence of the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium is that at least φ0 percent of agents pi ∈
P conclude γi (1− αi) < (1− φ0).
It is concluded from results I and II that, the necessary
condition for existence of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is
reduced by factor (1− α) in the developed strategy.
Case (ii) if φ0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then in this case the probability dis-
tribution of θ is reduced to: pi∗(θ) = 0 if θ = θ1 and pi∗(θ) = 1 if
θ = θ2. Obviously in this case, the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
has been selected or equivalently semantic interoperability has
emerged. Thus, an agent can stop the adoption process in this
situation since a certain quality of schema mapping (φ0) has
already been achieved.
V. EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
In the employed game models, we investigated the necessary
conditions that should be held in order adopt - a received
instance of a partial mapping µ - to be selected as a dominant
strategy. However, in general, all choosing reject could also
emerge as an equilibrium in the system. In case that multiple
equilibria exist, one way that one of them may finally emerge
is to become a focal point on which the expectations of
the players converge; this focal equilibrium could be de-
termined by some process of pre-play communication [11].
The proposed advertisement mechanism can be considered
as such a pre-play communication in the developed strategy.
In this mechanism, an agent avoids to advertise its mapping
µ when it has a high probability to be ignored by others.
It is reasonable then to assume that the expected value of
α by individual agents gradually increases and hence, the
decentralized strategy has the potential to focus the attention
of agents on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We can also give
a new interpretation to (8), stating the necessary condition for
existence of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the Bayesian
game with respect to α. Specifically, the dominant strategy is:
api
∗
=
{
a1 ;α < α
∗
a2 ;α > α
∗ ,
(9)
where α∗ = 1 − (1 − φ0)γ−1. In other words, the necessary
condition for the emergence of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
is that the assessment of αi, based on the local observations of
the participating agents pi ∈ P on the quality of the schema
mapping, satisfies αi > α∗.
The sufficient condition for the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
is also provided by the developed strategy if the sequential
increments in expected value of α, denoted by ∆α satisfy (as
also demonstrated in Section VI):
∆α ≥ ζ(1− α∗)(1− γ) (10)
for some constant ζ with 0 < ζ < 1. By using the geometric
improvement theorem from [12], it can be proved that in this
case α → φ0 and hence the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is
achieved. In other words, when α tends to φ0 , the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium becomes a focal point on which the
expectations of the agents converge.
The above statements are also supported by studying the
trajectories of the strategies (adoption or rejection) followed by
the agents with respect to the observed quality of the schema
mapping. To this end, we employ the replicator dynamics
equation for the game among homogeneous agents, which is:
x˙i
xi
= Vi − V¯ , (11)
where xi is the fraction of agents plays strategy i, x˙ is the
derivative of x with respect to time, Vi = Epi
∗
[U(ai|θ)] is
the expected payoff of pure strategy i and V¯ is the average
expected payoff by all strategies. Assuming that a fraction x1
of the agents plays reject and x2 = 1−x1 of them plays adopt,
then the per capita increase of x1 over time is given by:
x˙1
x1
= (ca − [1− φ0]/[1− α][b− ch])(1− x1) (12)
If γ(1 − α) < 1 − φ0 for the agents, then x˙1/x1 ≤ 0, ∀x1 ∈
[0, 1], and thus adopt is an evolutionary stable strategy of the
system. In other words, if γ(1−α) < 1−φ0for the participants,
the system will asymptotically converge to the equilibrium
where every agent adopts a received instance of an attribute
mapping which results in a more qualified schema mapping.
For a system of heterogeneous agents, the system would still
asymptotically evolve to the same equilibrium where every
agent pi plays adopt as long as γi(1− αi) < 1− φ0.
VI. EVALUATION RESULTS
We simulate the running example in Section II with a set
of N=40 service providers to investigate the emergence of
semantic interoperability. A consensus threshold of φ0 = 0.9
is considered by the interacting agents for their collectively
constructed schema mapping. We assume that the schema
mapping consists of A=30 attribute mappings (i.e. partial
mappings), each of which is subject to advertisement by an
agent. Without loss of generality, we assume that an advertised
attribute mapping is made available for a limited amount
of time by the registry to all registered service providers.
In our setting, the agents use AMC [7] and COMA++ [8]
as two different mapping tools to generate the mappings
between the schemas of the 2 registries, and the mappings
are given as XML path correspondences, e.g. (schema1.path1,
schema2.path2). The best qualified overall schema mapping
is defined as a perfect set of mappings, which is provided
by an expert. Initially, in each experiment, individual agents
autonomously generate an instance of the schema mapping by
using the aforementioned mapping tools. While an agent is not
aware of the best qualified mapping, it can measure the relative
quality of its current instance of the schema mapping, as
explained below. We perform each experiment in a number of
rounds. In each round, each agent decides on whether or not to
take the risk of advertising an attribute mapping of its current
schema mapping according to the advertisements that it has
seen in a specific time window of size w; w can be specified
in terms of a number of rounds or a number of received
advertisements. Each agent evaluates the quality improvement
by the Precision [13] of its schema mapping instance, i.e.
the proportion of correct mappings in the schema mapping
instance of an agent relatively to the mappings provided by
the expert. For each experiment, the values of the parameters
in the homogeneous setting are considered as the mean values
of respective parameters in the heterogeneous setting.
First, we investigate the decision process of adoption in the
set of agents. As the ratio of γ is the determining parameter for
the adoption decision of the agents, we keep the advertisement
cost cadv constant and run the experiment for different values
Fig. 1. The effect of increasing γ for cadv= 0.1ca, A=40, N=40, φ0=0.9,
and in the heterogeneous setting, γ¯=0.25
Fig. 2. The evolution of the expected value of α for cadv= 0.1ca, A=40,
N=40, φ0=0.9, and in the heterogeneous setting, γ¯=0.25
of γ. The average quality per round is illustrated in Fig. 1
to investigate the convergence rate to emergence of semantic
interoperability. As expected, if γ is greater than a specific
threshold (e.g. for a higher adoption cost ca), the necessary
condition for establishing the consensus is not satisfied. In this
case, each agent prefers to keep its current schema mapping
instead of adopting more qualified partial mappings and hence,
the improvement in the average quality of the schema mapping
is insignificant (e.g. see Fig.1 for γ = 0.3). As experimentally
found, the γ threshold is between 0.25 and 0.3, which is close
to our analytical prediction. Also, the minimum quality α of
the schema mapping is approximately around 0.65, as depicted
in Fig. 2. Thus, according to our analysis, and specifically
Eq. (8), only a value of γ lower than 0.286 would result
to the convergence of the schema quality to φ0 = 0.9 or
equivalently to the emergence of semantic interoperability. In
Fig.2, it is clearly illustrated the sequential increments in the
expected value of α satisfy the stated condition in Eq. (10)
for low-enough values of γ. Therefore, the sufficient condition
for reaching the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is satisfied for γ
values lower than 0.286, as discussed in SectionV .
Next, we investigate the decision process of advertisement
for the individual agents. We keep the benefit, the adoption
cost and the heterogeneity cost constant, while we vary the
advertisement cost in different runs of the experiment. As ex-
perimentally shown (see Fig. 3), the higher the advertisement
cost, the longer the time to reach the same average quality
of the schema mapping, since a smaller number of agents
decide to take the risk of advertising. It is clear, although
not illustrated, that for a relatively high cost of advertisement,
there would be no consensus on the quality of the schema
mapping, since the agents would avoid to advertise their partial
mappings altogether, as we expected by Eq. (5).
Fig. 3. The effect of increasing advertisement cost for b=1, ca=ch=0.1b,
A=40, N=40, φ0=0.9, and in the heterogeneous setting, c¯adv=0.1c¯a
VII. RELATED WORK
Due to the importance of interoperability as a necessary
requirement of many real-world applications of multi-agent
systems, this generic problem has been studied in various
contexts. [2] has formalized the notion of interoperability
by considering the choices of each autonomous agent and
studies how their choices are coordinated. The authors in [14]
propose an approach in which the agents use machine-learning
techniques to learn new concepts from other agents through
instance examples to improve their communication and thus
cooperation abilities. Also, the authors in [15] propose to set
up semiotic dynamics that achieve distributed coordination.
However, in our case, not all the agents necessarily converge
to the same semantic mappings, but they can still reach an
agreement by establishing a consensus on the quality of the
schema mapping. In [16], the authors analyze a dynamic
model known as the Naming game and discuss that it is
able to account for distributed coordination of autonomous
agents and emergence of global agreement. The authors in [17]
study semiotic dynamics of a similar model to [16], aiming at
defining the microscopic behavior of the agents in emergence
of shared vocabularies. They show that the model exhibits the
same phenomena as observed in human semiotic dynamics,
namely a period of preparation followed by a rather sharp
transition into global coordination. However, these developed
models cannot be applied in the context of establishing con-
sensus on the quality of a schema mapping, since they involve
two-way pairwise interactions, different mapping verification
method, and different end of game, as opposed to our model.
Moreover, the approach in [18] in the context of collaborative
data sharing has addressed semantic interoperability in a very
similar setting to the sample scenario of our work. However,
the proposed decision making approach in [18] is pertained to
static individual-based policies for the participants (to adopt
or reject updates), while we develop a dynamic consensus-
based decision making process for the participating agents.
In summary, while most of the aforementioned approaches
focus on developing different techniques in order to establish
interoperability, we focus on investigating under which cost
and benefit conditions semantic interoperability emerges, when
agents are self-interested.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employed a game-theoretic approach to
analyze the dynamics of bottom-up emergence of semantic
interoperability in a distributed setting of rational agents. We
analytically found that semantic emergence can arise even as
an evolutionary stable equilibrium, if certain conditions hold
regarding the communication cost, the cost of technological
adaptation, the expected mutual benefit from interoperability
as well as the expected loss from isolation. As a future work,
we plan to investigate the emergence of semantic agreement
in case of different agent communication models.
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